来自《耶鲁大学开放课程：博弈论 第23集 第23集》

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  So Firm B knows only its costs, and Firm A knows both costs.
  B只知道自己的成本而A知道双方的成本
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  But the key decision we're going to focus on is that
  那么我们现在就要考虑这个问题了
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  Firm A has an opportunity to reveal its true costs to Firm B.
  A有机会选择是否告诉B自己的成本
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  Now, it can do so in a verifiable way.
  它能够让B相信成本确实如此
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  For example, it could hire an accountant.
  比如说它可以雇一个会计师
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  That accountant from a reputable outside firm could come in
  该会计师来自一个知名的第三方事务所
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  and do the accounts for Firm A
  他负责核算A企业的账务
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  and then publish them in The Wall Street Journal or something.
  然后他把报表发布到了华尔街时报上
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  So Firm A can do that, and let's assume it's costless for it to do that.
  我们假设公布成本是无需额外开销的
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  So Firm A can costlessly and verifiably reveal its costs to B.
  让B相信A的成本无需额外的花销
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  The question is: this is going to happen before they play Cournot.
  但是这必须在古诺博弈开始前进行
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  The question is: should Firm A reveal those costs or not?
  那么A是否应该告诉对方自己的成本呢