来自《耶鲁大学开放课程：博弈论 第23集 第23集》

• 
  
  I also need to check that the employer's beliefs
  我还需要证明雇主的想法
• 
  
  are consistent with the equilibrium behavior.
  和均衡行为是一致的
• 
  
  So let's just stop and pause at that a second.
  我们先停下来再看一遍
• 
  
  We've never written down a condition like this for equilibrium,
  我们以前从未遇过这样的均衡
• 
  
  but here I have to. Here there was asymmetric information in the model.
  但现在遇到了 这是个非对称信息模型
• 
  
  And, in this equilibrium, one important party to the equilibrium,
  在这个均衡中 重要的一方
• 
  
  namely the guys who are going to employ you,
  就是即将雇用你的雇主
• 
  
  that's pretty important right?
  他们是很重要 没错吧
• 
  
  All they really have to do in this model, of any importance,
  在这个模型里他们最重要的就是
• 
  
  is form an inference based on your actions.
  通过你的行为来做出判断
• 
  
  They observe whether you get an education or not
  他们需要通过看你的受教育程度
• 
  
  and they conclude whether or not you're a good or bad worker.
  来推测你是好雇员还是差雇员